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ABSTRACT 
We consider the implications of cross-media transfers for the analysis of 
environmental policy and technology substitution. We discuss welfare implications from the 
standpoint of society and of the firm. Society's solution is shown to lead to the least level of 
damage, output, and waste treatment costs. 
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The effects of federal and state environmental regulations are, in general, well understood. (See 
Baumol and Oates [1988] and Cropper and Oates [1992] for useful reviews of these effects.) 
Management practices are a popular regulatory tool, especially in agriculture, to reduce pollution. One 
advantage of relying on best management practices (BMPs) to control pollution is that once they are in 
place, the need for actual monitoring of discharges is reduced. 
The specification ofBMPs raises two important issues regarding pollution prevention. First, 
different technologies may change the rate of release of pollutants by different amounts. A technology 
that leads to lower levels of carbon monoxide in the air, for example, might result in higher levels of 
another pollutant, such as dust particles or smog. Such pollutant substitution among competing 
technologies may necessitate some value judgment in deciding what mix of pollutant concentrations is 
socially optimal, and hence which technology to choose. A second issue has to do with cross-media 
transfers. Even when there is only one pollutant, there may be tradeoffs in the level of the single 
pollutant among the environmental media. 
In this paper we examine the issue of cross-media transfers, which was recognized also by 
Metcalfet al. (1984). We provide an analytical framework to help explain the concept of cross-media 
transfers in the context of technology substitution. And we characterize the conditions under which such 
transfers are socially beneficial and provide criteria for the choice of technologies as functions of the 
society's preferences for different environmental media. We begin by choosing technologies that are 
optimal for society. We then augment the analysis by considering several environmental policies. To 
simplify the analysis we use specific functional forms appropriately chosen to represent some general 
assumptions about society's preferences and the production and pollution prevention technologies. 
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The Cross-Media Transfers (CMT) Model 
Consider a profit-maximizer who produces a single good X sold at a constant and exogenous price P. 
A single pollutant, N, is produced as a byproduct of the production process. The factors required for 
production are represented by the input vector M. The firm chooses one of the available production 
technologies, indexed by i. We represent the constraint on the ,th production process by the inequality 
j,(X, N, M) z 0. The kth element in the input vector, wko is an exogenous price. 
The process by which the single pollutant is distributed into various environmental media is partly 
endogenous to the operations of the firm. We refer to this endogenous action on N as the waste management 
technology of the firm. This endogenous action may be influenced by regulatory policy. The effect of the 
waste management technology is to convert theN units of the pollutant into N a units in the air, N g units in 
groundwater, and N 5 units in surface water.! For simplicity we consider only air and groundwater in our 
analysis. We assume there are a number of waste management technologies indexed by j and that the 
constraint on thejlh waste management process is G1 (N, Na ,Ng) = 0. The waste management technologies 
have different cost structures and also result in different levels of N a and N g for a given amount, N of 
pollutant at the source.2 The use ofthejlh waste management technology requires a capital investment of 
K1 . It also entails some variable costs, which for the jlh waste management process, we shall represent as 
The presence of pollutants in the air and water is a disutility to society. We capture this disutility by a 
damage function D given as D = D( N a, N g) . For our analytical purposes we impose the following 
structure on the damage function: D1 > 0, Du z 0, 1 = a,g; Dag :> 0 where subscripts denote partial 
derivatives. Similarly we assume that for each waste management system}, G1 > 0, G u < 0, 1 = a,g; 
Gag > 0, Gga > 0, G,v < 0. Thus, when there is an increase in total pollution at the source, the levels of 
pollution in both air and groundwater increase at a decreasing rate. For the production transformation 
function we shall require f x < 0, f:v > 0, f M > 0. Finally, we impose the following restrictions on the 
1 In the absence of a waste management system, pollutants generated end up in the various environmental media in different 
proportions. Presumably the use of an appropriate waste treatment system would result in magnitudes and relative proportions of the 
pollutant in the different media that are less harmful to society. 
2 We distinguish between total pollution produced at the source, N, and total pollution resulting in the environment, .V a+ N g. From 
a strict mass balance perspective these may be considered equal. However, we allow for the possibility that the total level of pollution 
in the environment will be different from (typically less than) the level of pollution produced, due to some characteristics of the waste 
management process. For example, any recycling process could result in a level of pollution in the environment less than the amount 
of pollutant generated. Furthermore, if the portion of the environment we are concerned with is restricted, as we have done here, to 
say air and ground water, the distinction between the two becomes more apparent. 
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variable cost of the waste management technology: C1 > 0, C11 ;, 0, I= a,g; Cag :S 0. In the ensuing 
analysis, we maximize both the firm's and society's welfare, which are defined by net benefit functions. The 
net benefit function of the profit maximizing firm is revenues less production costs and waste management 
costs. Thus, the problem of the entrepreneur can be formulated as the maximization of an appropriate 
where L is the Lagrangian function and A J and fli are Lagrange multipliers. 
Society takes into account the damage caused pollutants in various environmental media and also 
imputes the costs of waste treatment. To adequately understand the problems facing society and the 
entrepreneur, it is useful to introduce some concepts. 
We define a cross-media transfer as the transfer of some amount of a given pollutant from one 
medium, say groundwater, to another, such as air. To explain this concept we define two curves: an 
isopollution curve and an isodamage curve. An isopollution curve is the locus of the combinations of Na and 
N g that result from a given level of total pollution, N. Similarly, an isodarnage curve is the locus of the 
combinations of Na and N g that result in the same level of damage to society. By the assumptions 
governing the first and second derivatives of the damage function it can be shown readily that the isodamage 
curve is concave to the origin in the N a - N g plane. On the other hand, the isopollution curve is convex to 
the origin in the N a - N g plane. An additional construct that is useful in the analysis of the firm's 
optimization problem is the familiar isocost curve. It is the locus of combinations of Na and N g that entail 
the same cost to the firm. 
Suppose that the optimal solution from the perspective of the firm as well as society implies the 
adoption of production technology i 0 and waste management technology j 0 . Let us further simplify things 
by assuming that there is only one input (k = I) in the production process. Then the firm's optimization 
problem reduces to 
(2) 
where the subscripts i 0 and J' have been dropped for simplicity. It is straightforward to show, with the aid 
of Figure I, that the optimal solution for the firm occurs at the tangential intersection of an isopollution locus 
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and an isocost curve, for if the firm chooses any other point on that pair of isopollution and isocost loci, there 
would be unnecessary losses in net revenue. 
Since the investment cost of waste treatment technologies is independent of the levels of N a and 
N g the isocost curve can be derived directly from the variable cost function C( N a, N g) . Suppose that the 
variable cost of waste treatment is fixed at a value, say C. Then the isocost locus, Na(Ng), is the solution 
- dN Cu 
to the equation C(N a, N g)- C = 0, with corresponding slope __ a = ----"-. Similarly, the isopollution 
dNg Ca 
locus, Na(N g), is the solution to the equation G(N, Na,N g)= 0. The slope of this locus is 
dN G 
__ a = _ _.!I._. Thus the solution to the firm's problem will satisfy Cg I Ca = G g I Ga. This occurs at point 
dNg Ga 
A in Figure I. 
The optimal solution in the case of society takes a form similar to the preceding. Since the net benefit 
function of society includes the cost of the waste treatment technology, the isocost curve is of relevance here 
as well. However, society is also concerned about the damage caused by pollution. Thus, the total cost to 
society is captured by an augmentation of the isodamage locus by the profile of isocost. The optimal solution 
to society occurs at the tangential intersection of the resulting augmented isodamage locus3 and the 
dN Dg+Cg 
isopollution locus. The slope of the augmented isodamage locus is __ a_= so that the solution 
dNg Da+Ca 
to society's problem will satisfy (Dg + Cg) I (Da + C0 ) = G g I Ga. 
The left hand side of this equation represents the marginal rate of substitution in the augmented 
damage function. The right hand side represents the marginal rate of cross-media substitution in waste 
management technology. Thus for the optimal solution to be achieved, the marginal rate of cross-media 
substitution in the waste management technology must be set equal to the marginal rate of substitution in the 
augmented damage function. The optimal solution occurs at point B in Figure I where the augmented 
isodamage locus and the isopollution curve are tangential to each other. The figure has been drawn to reflect 
a scenario where society would choose less overall damage, involving a higher ratio of air to goundwater 
pollution than the firm. In order to obtain more specific and useful information from this model, we will 
presently impose additional structure on the functions defined here. 
Let us first assume that the production technology of the firm is given as 
3 We shall refer to the total cost to society as an augmented social damage function, defined as the sum of social damage due to 
pollution and the waste treatment costs incurred by the firm. 
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f(X,N,M)=XY,MY"NYv -A, Yo <O<yN, YM >0, Yo+YM+YN =0, A>O. 
Thus, all technologies suitably captured by this Cobb-Douglas form can be indexed by the levels of the 
parameters y 0 , y N and y !J. The waste management technology is defined more specifically as 
G(N,Na,Ng) =a a InN a +ag lnNg -InN, a a +ag =I, a a> 0, ag > 0. 
With this specification the waste management technology can be indexed by a a. We specifY the variable 
cost of the waste management process as C(Na, N g)= a aNa 2 +a gN /, a a > 0, a g > 0. Finally the 
damage to society due to the pollutant is assumed to be captured by D( N a, N g) = f3 aN a 2 + f3 gN / , 
{3 a > 0, {3 g > 0. 
Assuming an interior point, the optimal solution to society's problem is more specifically given as: 
X*s = fl *s (Y,v + y M )A I p X*s = fl *5 (Yx +y .If )A I p X*s = fl *s (Yx + y M )A I p, 
N *s = ~fl *s ssyNA, Na *s = ~fl *s YNAaa I (a a+ f3a) 
N g *5 = ~ fl *5 y N A(!- a a) I (a g + {3 g) , A *5 = fl *5 y N A and fl *5 = TJS 5 where 
I+ 2y_\l 2y_\t -(l+y_,.) a 1-a 
TJ=(pl[yx+YM]t y, (yM!w) Yv YNA 2 , ss=(aa![aa+f3al) '([l-aa]l[ag+f3g]) " 
and the superscripts denotes society's solution values as opposed to those of the firm. The solution to the 
firm's problem is of a similar form, except that we now have 
Na *1 = ~fl •f YxAaa I a a, Ng •f = ~fl*J YNA(I-aa)l a g, and 
f _ ( )a, ( )1-a, s - aalaa (1-aa)/ag 
Having identified the optimal solutions in such specific terms, we are able to obtain some useful 
inferences about the differences between society's solution and that of the firm, as well as the implications for 
environmental policy. We begin with an examination of the firm's and society's solutions with the aid of 
Figure 2. In that figure, the solution to the firm's problem is depicted as point A, where the isocost and 
isopollution loci are tangential to each other. Society's solution, as is apparent from above, entails lower 
levels of all the variables. Furthermore, depending on the relative magnitudes of the parameters of the 
damage and cost functions, society's solution might involve much lower levels of N g relative to N a or vice 
versa. In Figure 2, we have assumed that it involves a much lower level of Ng relative to Na. Society's 
solution is at point B where the augmented isodamage function is tangential to an isopollution locus. 
Decomposition of tbe Optimal Solution 
It is useful, at this stage. to decompose the difference between society's solution and that of the firm 
into two components. We refer to these as a substitution effect and a pollution reducing effect. The 
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substitution effect of society's decision relative to that of the firm is the cross-media transfer of pollution that 
brings the relative levels of Na and N g in line with society's preferences. This is depicted in Figure 2 as a 
movement from point A to C where a scalar translation of the augmented isodamage locus is tangential to the 
isopollution locus relevant to the firm's problem. The substitution effect thus entails an adjustment of the 
levels of Na and N g to reflect society's relative preferences for air and groundwater pollution, while 
maintaining the total level of pollution generated according to the firm's optimal solution. We refer to point 
Cas the compensated solution, as opposed to point A, which is the firm's solution and point B, which is 
society's optimal solution. The pollution reducing effect refers to the reduction in the level of total pollution 
that comes as a result of society imputing a positive cost to the damage inflicted on society by the pollutant, 
while holding unchanged the relative levels of N a and N g. The pollution reducing effect is illustrated in 
Figure 2 as a movement from point C to point B, society's optimal solution. The compensated levels of air 
and ground water pollution can be readily derived from the above. We obtain 
N~ =Nf I[B(l-a")12 ] and N; =N{8"o 12 where B=[(era +,Ba)er,]l[(er, +,B,)eraJ. 
The solutions to these problems enable us to derive expansion paths from the perspectives of society 
and the firm. Given our technology specifications, the expansion paths are straight lines through the origin. 
They are defined as Nf =Jer,aa I [era(l-a0 )]N{ for the firm and N~ =J(er, +,B,)aa ![(era +,BaXl-aa)JN; 
for society. It is clear, that just as for the optimal solution, the expansion path of society coincides with that 
of the firm if and only if cr a I cr g = J3 a I J3 g ; that is, the relative weights society attaches to air and 
groundwater pollution are in the same ratio as the relative weights of the media-specific pollutants in the cost 
of the waste management process of the firm. 
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Welfare Implications 
Let us maintain, without loss of generality, the assumption that society cares more about groundwater 
pollution than air pollution. More specifically, let us say that the weight society attaches to groundwater 
relative to air pollution is greater than the ratio of marginal cost of groundwater to that of air pollution in the 
waste treatment process. Then the isocost, isodamage, and augmented isodamage loci are as depicted in 
Figure 2. We have drawn the relevant isopollution loci to show the three solution points. Given our 
assumptions, we can arrive at the following proposition. 
Proposition 1 
When society's net benefit function accounts for damage caused by pollution as well as cost incurred 
by the firm in waste treatment, the firm disregards the damage caused by pollution, and once the production 
and waste treatment technologies have been specified, society's solution involves less social damage as well 
as less cost to the firm than the firm's outcome. However, this comes with less total pollution and less output 
than the firm's solution. Under these conditions, if the firm were allowed to choose the level of output and 
total pollution generated, society would be better off if the firm followed society's expansion path so that the 
levels of media-specific pollutants are in a ratio that reflects society's preferences. The resulting output-
compensated solution leads to a higher cost to the firm than if it followed its own preferences. However, the 
associated reduction in social damage outweighs the increase in cost to the firm. 
It is important to note that the our result may not hold true if society did not account for the firm's 
waste treatment costs. 
Proposition 2 
Given the conditions in Proposition I, society's solution entails less air as well as less groundwater 
pollution than the firm's solution. Thus, the pollution reducing effect of society's decisions outweigh the 
cross-media substitution effect. 
This is a very strong result since it is true regardless of the values of the parameters. It is primarily 
because society considers both the damage caused by pollution and the cost incurred by the firm. 
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The Role of Technology in the CMT model 
So far we have assumed that the production and waste management technologies were exogenously 
given. In this section we investigate the role of technology choice in the model. We consider technology 
choice from the perspective of society since that of the firm is a special case where essentially f3 a = f3 g = 0. 
Before proceeding, we introduce some terminology. We consider a waste management technology to be 
adequately defined by the double log form specified above and the duplex (a a, a g). A technology is said to 
be of class a if a a +a g =a. In most of the preceding discussion, we have assumed a technology of class 
a= 1. A production technology is completely defined by the Cobb-Douglas transformation function 
specified and the triplet ( y0, y M, y N ). Let us now consider some implications of technology choice, 
assuming that a = 1 and Yo + y M + y N = 0, unless otherwise specified. 
Pollution Minimizing Technologies 
Considering society's optimal solution, we observe that all the choice variables are increasing in 
f.1. *s . Hence they are all increasing in Es . The expression for £ 3 thus provides us with an opportunity to 
analyze the effects of different waste management technologies on the levels of the choice variables. Recall 
that as far as the levels of pollutants in the environment are concerned, we can index the waste management 
technologies by the parameter a a . A technology with a higher value of a a leads to more air pollution and 
less ground water pollution than one with a lower value, given the same level of total pollution, N. Recall 
also that f3 a and f3 g represent the weights attached to air and groundwater pollution by society in the 
damage function, while a a and a g are the respective weights in the cost function of the firm. 
Thus the level of a a that minimizes £ 3 is the one that solves 
dss a f3 +a 
__ = O ~ a = a a (3) 
daa 1-aa /3g+ag 
The implied value of a a is a a*= (a a+ f3 a) I (a a+ f3a +a g + f3 g). Proposition 3 follows directly. 
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Proposition 3 
For all technologies suitably represented by G(N,Na,N gl =a a In Na +a gInN g-InN, with 
a a aa as index, 
(a) the technology that minimizes f 5 is a a*= (a a+ f3al I (a a+ f3a +a g + f3 gl. 
(b) From the solutions to the first-order conditions this same technology leads to the minimum level of output 
(X*), input use (M*) and total pollution produced at the source (N*). 
We thus refer to (3) as the minimum pollution criterion. 
Our analysis does not guarantee the existence of such a technology. Therefore, a relevant issue is 
how to compare two or more technologies that do not exactly meet the minimum pollution criterion. 
Fortunately, an alternative criterion of comparison emerges from the above derivations. From these we know 
that f 5 is strictly convex in a a with a minimum at a a*= (a a+ f3al I (a a+ f3a +a g + f3 g). Thus, we 
conclude that the closer a a is to a a*, the closer is f 5 to£~,.= c'(aa *) = 
II (a a + f3 a + a g + f3 g) . We may summarize these conclusions in the next proposition. 
Proposition 4 
a. The closer is a technology's ratio, a a I (1- a a) to the ratio of society's weights, 
(a a + f3 a) I (a g + f3 g), the better is that technology in a pollution minimizing sense. 
b. The best available technology in a pollution minimizing sense is the solution to 
argminjaa -aa *j, 
a, 
where a a in this case is an index of all available technologies and a a* as defined above, is the pollution 
minimizing technology. 
Environmental Policy in the CMT Model 
We next augment our analysis with two types of technology standards. The first alternative places a 
ceiling on a , say a :5 t < I while a a and a g are allowed to take any values satisfying a a +a g = a . As 
f is increasing in a we expect that in the absence of any other restrictions, a profit maximizing entrepreneur 
will prefer to have a= t. Furthermore, since profit is given by 11: = pX- wM- K1 = rwr .vA- K1 , referring 
to Figure 3, the producer will choose a a • = argmin{K0 ,K,} where K0 is the overhead cost of the 
a, 
technology (a a = O,a g = t), and K1 is the overhead cost of the technology (a a = t,a g = 0). If the 
situation depicted in Figure 3 prevails, society would be better off if K0 > K1 since in that case a a = t will 
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be the chosen technology and total damage will be less than that accompanying the other technology. 
However, if K 0 < K 1 , the entrepreneur would choose a a = 0 and there would be more pollution. 
The second technology policy places a more relaxed ceiling on a so that now a :51 but it restricts 
the choices of a a and a g to a a I a g = (fJ a +a a) I (fJ g +a g), the pollution minimizing criterion for a 
given class. Clearly in this case the entrepreneur chooses a= 1 and hence 
a a = (a a + f3 a) I (a a+ f3 a+ a g + f3 g) with fs = 1 I (a a+ f3 a+ a g + f3 g). Which of these technology 
policies is better from the standpoint of society or the finn is clearly an empirical issue. If I is close enough to 
I, the second technology leads to less social damage and also less profit to the finn than the first. Note also 
that regardless of the value of I, we can conclude that if K0 < K1, then the first standard leads to more 
groundwater pollution and less air pollution than the second. Similarly, if K0 > K1 , the first standard leads 
to less groundwater pollution than the second. Suppose the situation depicted in Figure 3 prevails. Then if 
K 0 < K 1 , the second technology policy would also result in less pollution damage to society. However, if 
K0 > K1, the first technology policy (a a :5 I< 1) would result in less pollution damage. 
Summary 
In this paper we provided a framework to analyze environmental policy when the transfer of 
pollutants from one medium to another is deemed important. Such cross-media transfers could occur when an 
environmental policy consisting chiefly of technology standards results in the adoption of a technology with 
relative rates of pollution retention that differ markedly from the status quo. Thus a policy that leads to the 
adoption of an "air-friendly" technology might lead to more groundwater pollution. We derive conditions for 
a pollution minimizing technology and show that for such a technology the rates of media-specific pollutant 
retention are in the same relative proportions as society's weights on pollutants in the respective media 
augmented by costs of controlling pollutants in those media. 
Our analysis was augmented by considering two types of technology standards. One standard 
requires the entrepreneur to adopt a waste management system that retains much of the generated pollutant, 
regardless of which proportions end up in the different environmental media. Another standard requires no 
significant retention of total pollutants. However, the entrepreneur was expected to adopt a waste 
management system that distributes pollutants in the various environmental media in proportions similar to 
society's weights. If the amount of retention required in the first standard is small, the second policy, in 
general, leads to lower social damage and lower net returns to the entrepreneur than the first. 
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Some welfare implications of society's solution, the firm's solution, and an output-( or total pollution) 
compensated solution were examined. We concluded that society's optimal solution leads to the least level of 
social damage, cost to the firm of waste treatment, and all the other choice variables including the levels of 
output and total pollution generated. 
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